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IN THE SUPR~ME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. TYPOGRAPHICAL CORRECTIONS 
THO!otAS WYMAN BERG, Case No. 16548 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Appellant 
to appellants brief: 
Cover page: 
Page 2, line 3: 
Page 2, line 9: 
Page 3, line 17: 
Page 3, line 19: 
Page 4, line 13: 
Page 5, line 18: 
Page 5, line 23: 
- .1. 
submits the following typographical corrections 
"noting" should read: nothing 
"decisions reversed" should read: decision is 
reversed 
"noting" should read: nothing 
"no" should read: not 
"tolk" should read: told 
"v.2d" should read: U.2d 
"prohibitations" should read: prohibitions 
"(1978)" should read: (1798) 
_-V<' 
Dated this ~) day of December, 1979. 
ED\~ARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for the Appellant 
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IN THE SUPREME OXJRT OF 'IRE S'I2\TE OF UTAH 
STATE OF urAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
BRIEF OF APPEr..LAN1' 
Case No. 16548 
THOW\S WYMAN BERG I 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant-appellant appeals from his conviction by the Honorable 
George E. Ballif, Fourth District Judge, sitting with::>ut jury, of the offense 
of distribution of a controlled substance where nothing for value was ex-
changed. He further appeals from the Court's failure to find that the State's 
principal witness against him was his accarrplice and fran the Court's failure 
to require corroboration of the ac=rplices test:im:Jny. 
DISPOSTIION IN THE LOWER COURI' 
Appellant was found guilty on May 25, 1979 by the Honorable George 
E. Ballif of a violation of Section 58-37-8 (1) A (c), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), distributing a controlled substance, marijuana, where nothing for 
value was exchanged. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 00 APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the ~ower Court's decision that 
ti1e State's principal witness against him was not his accanplice and that 
-1-
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in any event her test.inony need not have been corroborated because of the 
changes made in Section 77-31-18, U.C.A. (1953) by the 1978 legislature, 
In the event that the lower Court' s decisions reversed, appellant requests 
that the charges against him be dismissed because the evidence against him 
was insufficient to sustain a conviction. 
STATEMENI' OF FOCTS 
On January 16, 1979, appellant was charged by cOIIplaint with having . 
ccmnitted the offense of distribution of a controlled substance, rrarijuana, 
where noting of value was exchanged. Tre offense was alleged to have taken 
place oil Novenber 21, 1978 (Record-ll). On infonration charging that offense 
! 
was subsequently filed in the Fourth Judicial District Court (R-ll). On 
May 8, 1979, former Section 77-31-18 (all statutory citations are to Utah 
Code Armotated tm.less otherwise noted) was repealed and a new section 77-31-E 
took effect. The new section p=vides that, " (a) conviction may be had on 
the tmcorroborated test.inony of an acCOIIplice." On May 24, 1979, appellant's: 
trial was held before the Honorable George E. Ballif. The appellant waived 
his right to a jury trial, stipulated to the admission of certain evidence, 
and the State proceeded to call three witnesses. 
The first witness was one Jill Hales. Ms. Hales testified that sh: 
knew the defendant and that she had rret with him in his hare on the m::>rning 
of November 21, 1978 to acquire sorre "stuff" for a friend (T-14). Ms. Hales 
was accOIIpanied by a Teri Barney. Ms. Hales testified that she and the 
appellant had a conversation out of the presence of Ms. Barney that rroming, 
(T-15). The appellant said, "I have got this for you," (T-16), indicating 
a potmd of marijuana "sitting in the living r=m." Ms. Hales said she put 
the rrarijuana in her purse and said she would bring m::>ney back later, but no 
-2-
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definite arrangerrents for paynent were made ('1'-17). No payment was in fact 
ever made. Ms. Hales then stated that pursuant to a pre-arranged plan with 
a Craig Wiseman, she drove to a local restaurant and put the marijuana in 
Wiseman 1 s car (T-18) . Teri Barney acconpanied her. Wisem:m then paid Hales 
for the marijuana ('1'-19). Upon leaving the restaurant parking lot, Hales 
was arrested (T-20). Hales was told by the officers at the police station 
that she had the ch:>ice to either becCI!e a paid tmdercover narcotics informant 
or else she VIOuld go to prison and lose custody of her little girl (T-22, 
33-35, 39). She opted to becCI!e an informant and charges were in fact dropped 
against her pursuant to a grant of inmunity she received in exchange for her 
testirrr::>ny in this case, (T-30) • She was wired with an electronic listening 
device and returned to the appellant 1 S h::tre, where she thought that the 
appellant may have asked her if the police had got "it" ('1'-23). No tape or 
transcript of their conversation was ever introduced into evidence. 
The State 1 s second witness was Teri Barney, the wanan wh:J had accom-
panied Hales to the appellant 1 s hCile and then to the Wisem:m car. She 
testified that she had no heard any conversation between the appellant and 
Hales on November 21, 1978 ('1'-45). She said that she and Hales left the Berg 
ho11E in her car and Hales asked her to drive by the restaurant (T-46). When 
they arrived there, Hales tock a plastic package out of her purse which Barney 
believed to be marijuana. No one ever tolk her if it was or not ('1'-47). Ms. 
Barney did not know if Hales had taken the purse into the appellant 1 s h:>!1E, 
she did not know how long the marijuana had been in the purse, Hales never 
opened the purse and showed her the contents before or after they went to 
the appellant 1 s hollE, and they in fact never even discussed what sre had in 
the purse (T-50), or why they were going to the restaurant (T-51). Hales then 
took the plastic package, wrapped it in a windbreaker, and put the wrapped 
-3-
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package in Wisern:m 's car (T-48) • 
The State's final witness was Craig Wisern:m. Wisern:m testified that 'I 
he had asked Hales to get him "a potmd," (T-54). He also said that he had i 
seen Hales arrive at the restaurant and had paid her a sum of rroney (T-56). 
Wiseman later found the marijuana in the back seat of the car (T-57). 
The appellant erose to rest witmut presenting any testirrony. He 
argued that Hales was an accomplice and as such her testirrony required corr-
aboration. Appellant contended that co=ooration was absent or insufficient' 
and thus he smuld have been fotmd not guilty. The Court took the matter 
under advisemmt (T-63-79) 
On May 25, 1979 the Court issued a rrerrorandum decision finding the 
appellant guilty, (R-21-23). The Court based its decision on State v. Kasai, 
27 v.2d 326, 495 P.2d 1265 (1972) and State v. Cornish, 560 P.2d 1134 (Utah l9i 
It also based its decision on the enactrrent of House Bill 143, now Section 
77-31-18, providing that a conviction may be had on the tmco=ooorated test-
irrony of an accomplice, (R-23) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPLICATICN OF THE NEW SB:TICN 77-31-18 TO THIS CASE WAS 
crnTRARY TO THE EX POST FACIO PROVISICNS OF THE STATE AND 
FEDERAL CCNSTITUTICNS AND CCNTRARY TO U'I1IH LAW. 
If this Court concludes that the lower Court was correct in applying 
to this case the version of Section 77-31-18 which took effect on M2:t 8, 1979, 
it need not reach the issues of whether or not the witness Hales was an ace-
omplice of the appellant or whether her testirrony was corrooorated because 
such issues would be superfluous. The new Section now permits the conviction 
of a defendant on the tmcorrooorated testirrony of an accanplice. !:CMeJer, 
the lower court erred when it applied the new accomplice statu~e to ~cLS 
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action. The application of the new statute was prohiliited by the State and 
Federal Constitutions as well as State law. 
The events which gave rise to the proceedings against the appellant 
were alleged to have occurred on Novenber 21, 1978. On that day, and when 
the information was filed in January, 1979, the accatplice statute provided, 
" A conviction shall not be had on the testirron.y of an 
aceatplice, unless he is corroborated by other evidence 
which in itself and without the aid of the testincny of 
the accorrplice tends to connect the defendant with the 
comnission of the offense; and the co=oboration shall 
not be sufficient, if it rrerely shows the comnission of 
the offense or the ciretml.Stances thereof." 
On May 24,1979, the case went. to trial. The lower court, in finding the 
appellant guilty, applied the accarplice statute which had taken effect 16 
days earlier, providing that," a conviction rray be had on the uncorroborated 
testi.Irony of an accomplice," Section 77-31-18. The application of the new 
Section violated constitutional restraints on ex post facto laws. 
The constitutional prohiliitations of ex post facto laws are contained 
in Article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 18 of the Utah Constitution. The forrrer states, "no state shall •.. 
pass any . . . ex post facto law," while the latter ccmnands that, " no ... ex 
post facto law ... shall be passed." The United States Suprerre Court, in 
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1978), gave the term "ex post facto law" a 
definition which has endured nearly 200 years, 
" 1st, every law that nakes an action done before the 
passing of the law; and which was innocent when done, 
criminal; and punishes su:::h action. 2nd, every law 
that advocates a cr.:.rre, or nakes it greater than it was 
when cormlitted. 3d, every law that changes the pun-
ishrrent, and inflicts a greater punishrralt, than the 
law annexed to t.re crirre when corrrnitted. 4th, every 
law that alters the legal rules of evidence and rec-
eives less or different testimony, than the law 
required at the tine cf the corrrnission of the offense 
in order to convict the offender. All these and 
slinilar laws, are r.Bnifestly in just and oppressive," 
Id. I 390-391 . 
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The Court's explanation in calder v. Bull was refined in Hopt v. 
Utah, 110 u.s. 574 (1883). Hopt was a homicide case. At the tine of the 
hanicide, the Utah Territory had a law which forbade testinony by convicted 
felons. After the indictnent, but prior to the trial, the legislature 
i 
repealed the law. Subsequently I the appellant was convicted. His conviction I 
a convicted felon who would not have bee.~ in part rested upon the testinony of 
pez:mi.tted to testify under the law in effect at the tine the offense was I 
ccmni.tted. The appellant argued that permitting the convicted felon to testir,l 
against him anounted to an ex post facto application of law. The Court re- J 
jected his contention, stating, " Statutes which sirrply enlarge the class of 
persons wh:> may be corrpetent to testify in criminal cases are not ex pest factc 
in their application to prosecutions for crilres crnmitted prior to their 
passage; for they do not . • . alter the degree, or lessen the anount or rreasure, 
of the proof ·which was made necessary to conviction when the crilre was comnitte) 
Id, 110 u.s. 574, 589. In contrast, the Court warned, "Any statutory alter-
ation of the legal rules of evidence which would authorize conviction upon 
less proof, in anount or degree, than was required when the offence was 
conmitted, might, in respect of that offence, be obnoxious to the constitutiolli, 
inhibition utXJn ex post facto laws, " Id., 110 U.S. 574,590. 
In the present case, the change in the accarrplice statute on M3.y 8, 1 
did not rrerely, "enlarge the class of persons who may be carrpetent to testify, 
Hopt v. Uta1-!, supra. Accarrplices have always been canpetent witnesses \D'lder 
the old statute. Instead, the change in the statute authorized "conviction 
upon less proof, in arrount or degree, than was required when the offence was 
ccmnitted," Id. Under the law in effect at the tiiTe of the offense, the 
-6-
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acCO!!Plice 's testirrony required corroboration, while under the new law it did 
not. Thus, under the new law, the defendant could be convicted under less 
proof, and to apply the new law -would be to apply an ex post facto law. 
This was the conclusion of the Alabama Suprerre Court over 100 years 
ago when presented with precisely the same issue as is before this Court. 
In Hart v. State, 40 Ala. 32, (1866), the defendant was indicted for gambling 
in 1860. In 1863, the Alabama Legislature passed a law providing that an 
accomplice's testim::lny need not be corroborated in misdeneanor cases, such 
as gambling. After the law was enacted the defendant was convicted solely 
on the testim::lny of an accarplice. The Alabama Suprene Court reversed the 
conviction, mlding that to give the new statute a retroactive effect "-would 
rrade it an ex post facto law, " 40 Ala. 32, 35. The Court stated that the · 
uncorroborated testim:lny of an acconplice was, " ••• less than, if not different 
from, that required by law at the tine the offense is alleged to have been 
corrmi tted. If • . • the conviction on the sole testirrony of an aoconplice, 
is not less evidence than that required at the tine of the alleged catmission 
of the offense .•. it is difficult for rre to conceive what is rreant by the 
rule laid down in Calder v. Bull, " 40 Ala. 32, 36-37. 
While the precise issue has never arisen in this State, ~le reason 
exists to suggest that this COurt should follow the conclusion reached in 
Alabama. Section 68-3-5 states, "The repeal of a statute does not ••• affect 
any right which has accrued . . . or any action or proceeding conrrenced under 
or by virtue of the statute repealed." The repeal of the old acconplice 
statute could thus not affect the appellants "right"to have acconplice test-
ilrony corroborated because the action was "conrrenced under" that statute. 
Its repeal could not affect the pending action. The Utah Suprene Court 
'M:luld seem to agree. In State v. Kelbach , 56 9 P. 2d 1100, (Utah 1977) , the 
-7-
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Court observed, 
" • • • the law sh:mld not be changed sirrq?ly because of the 
will or desire of judges as to what the law is or ought to 
be. Much less so, srould it be so changed during the 
course of a particular pr=eeding to have a retroactive 
effect thereon . • • If there is to be such a change in the 
law .•• it seems that it srould have only prospective 
effect and that fairness and good conscience require 
that it srould not be applied retroactively to adversely 
affect rights as they existed at the tirre a particular 
controversy arose, " 56 9 P. 2d 1100 , 110 2 . 
It is apparent that the Court below erred when it failed to apply tre 
old accomplice statute and require corroboration of the Hales testirtony. 
However, even under the old statute, corroboration v.Duld not be required if 
Hales was not an accrnrplice. 
POlNT II 
THE STI\.'IE' S PR.IN:IPAL WITNESS, HALES, WAS AN ACCOMPLICE. 
The principal witness against the appellant was Jill Hales. She 
rrerits that designation because hers was the only testirtony to connect him 
with the coornission of an offense. If she were not an accomplice her test-
i."YDny alone might be sufficient to sustain a conviction. However, because 
she was an accorrplice her test:irrony should have been corrol:orated. 
An "accorrplice" has been variously defined as "one who is or could 
be charged as a principal with the defendant on trial, i.e. one who is liable 
to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on 
trial," State v. Kasai, 27 U.2d. 326, 327, 495 P.2d. 1265, 1266 (1972}; or 
"one woo participates in a crirre in such a way that he could be tried and 
charged for the same offense," State v. Cornish, 560 P.2d. 1134 (Utah 1977). 
Under Utah law, one can be "charged as a principal" when he or she, "acting 
with the rrental state required for the cc::mnission of an offense ... solicits, 
-8-
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requests, corrrnands, encourages, or intentionally aid another person to 
engage in =nduct which constitutes an offense ... , " Section 76-2-202. 
A superficial examination of State v. Kasai, supra, might lead the 
Court to conclude that Hales was rot an accanplice of the appellant. The 
Court should not make that mistake. Kasai said, "The purchaser of nar=tics 
is not an accanplice of the seller, as the offense of the purchaser is 
"possession" and not "selling" and, therefore the conviction of a defendant 
nay be founded on the purchaser's unco=borated testirrony," 495 P.2d 1265, 
1266. This phrase has no great significance for the present appeal because 
it is obsolete and rray have only been e=neous or unnecessary dictum. 
Unlike Kasai, the present case does not involve a "sale" or a 
"purchase" but rather a distribution without value. The nental state for that 
offense required the appellant to act "knowingly and intentionally." Hales, 
acting with the sarre mental state, "solicited, requested, and en=uraged" the 
appellant to ccmnit the offense by calling him and asking him to procure 
narijuana for her friend and then going to his hc.ue to obtain it. She even 
"intentionally aided" him to ccmnit the offense by actually accanplishing 
the distribution element of the offense rerself when she walked over to where 
the rrarijuana lay and picked it up. Her actions would permit her to be 
charged as a principal under Section 76-2-202. She would also be an accatplice, 
because an "a=anplice" is "a person wro could be charged as a principal 
with the defendant on trial," State v. Davie, 121 u. 184, 240 P.2d 263 (1952) · 
Section 76-2-202, which broadened the definition of those wro =uld be charged 
as principals, took effect the year after the Kasai decision and rrade such 
narrcw concepts as "buyer" and "seller" obsolete. 
-9-
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Kasai may also have been wrongly decided. Appellant suggests that 
the reason the buyer was held not to be an accarplice of the seller was not 
nerely because he was the "buyer" but rather because he was an undercover 
p::>licernan. As su:h, he could hardly be said to be acting with the rrental 
state required for the carrnission of the offense or any offense for that ITB.tter 
so as a matter of law he could not be an accanplice. He was rrerely offering 
Mr. Kasai the opportunity to cormnit a cr.i.Ire and considerations of who was tre i 
buyer and wro the seller were irrelevant. 
Appellant's position is supported by State v. Cornish , 560 P. 2d 1134 
(utah 1977) . There the court was again presented with an undercover !X)lice 
officer wro had purchased narcotics. The defendant again contended that tre 
officer was an acconplice whose testirrony required corroboration. The Court 
rejected this argunent, not because the officer was a buyer, but because tre 
definition of accorcplice " . . . does not include a person who, without using 
indu:errent or persuasion which would anount to entraprrent, rrerely provides an 
opportunity for one who is disposed to corrrnit a cr.i.Ire. fure specifically 
applicable here, a person so acting under the direction of a peace officer 
in atteirpting to discover violations of law, is not an acconplice," 560 P · 2d 
1134, 1136. Cornish dispensed with the distinction between buyer and seller 
drawn in Kasai and recognized the true reason a police buyer is not an accan-
plice, he does not have the requisite criminal intent. 
In the present case, the witness Hales was not a police officer, 
agent, or even a buyer. Acting with the sarre rrental state as alleged tc be 
present in the plaintiff, she aided, solicited, and encouraged the appellant 
to =it the offense of distribution of a controlled substance where nothing 
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of valu: was exchanged. Her actions made her liable as a principal tmder 
Section 76-2-202 and as su.:::h, she was an accarplice wmse testincny required 
corroboration. 
POINT III 
IW.ES TEST~ WAS NOI' SUFFICIENTLY CORROBORATED 
It has long been the rule that the, " .•. corroborating evidence 
IrnlSt :implicate the defendant in the offense and be consistent with his guilt 
and inconsistent with his innocence, and nrust do l!Dre than cast a grave 
suspicion upon him, and all of this nrust be witmut the aid of the testincny 
of the ac=nplice," State v. Erwin, 101 U. 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941). In 
this case there was no sufficient corroboration. 
The only ~witnesses besides Hales were Barney and Wisertan. 
Barney testified that she had been with Hales in the Berg hcrre, that she had 
not seen the transfer of any marijuana, and that she had no idea where the 
marijuana she later saw Hales re=ve fran her purse came from or hew long it 
had been in there. Wisemm never entered or carre near the Berg hc::me and pre-
sented no testillDny on the source of the marijuana. The State presented no 
corrooorati ve evidence "consistent with Berg's guilt." 
CCN::LUSION 
The lower Court erred in failing to find that Jill Hales was an 
accomplice of the appellant whose testillDny required corroooration. This 
Court smuld reverse that decision and dismiss the charges against the defen-
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dant for the reason that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict 
him and a second trial could well violate the double jeopardy clause. 
Dated this :;) ~ day of Deceni:ler, 1979. 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General, Attorney for 
J+l I 
Respondent, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 on this the _, _ 
day of December, 1979. 
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